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not serve as a standard by which the Board determines whether it has
jurisdiction. Where the Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction because of a failure to satisfy the yardstick, it is not necessarily saying
that this jurisdiction does not exist. Satisfaction of these yardsticks
not only indicates that the Board will exercise jurisdiction in a particular case but also that jurisdiction exists in the Board in such case,
since it seems unlikely that the Board would exercise jurisdiction
where jurisdiction did not exist. Where the Board's yardstick is not
satisfied, the case formerly would fall into the "no man's land" created
by the Guss case. However, the "no man's land" has been eliminated
by section 701 of the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act
of 1959. Under this provision the state courts have jurisdiction where
the Board, although having jurisdiction, declines to exercise its jurisdiction because the business involved is insufficient to meet the Board's
yardstick test for exercise of jurisdiction.2 9 Since the relator's yearly
gross revenue exceeded the $500,000 level, its business satisfied the
Board's jurisdictional yardstick and therefore it would seem that the
Board had jurisdiction of the case.
The Washington court seems to have required a finding that the
relator's business was an integral part of interstate commerce, rather
than merely a business affecting interstate commerce, in order for it
to hold that the dispute was subject to NLRB jurisdiction. The relator's transportation of passengers to the interstate carrier terminals
and of travelers from such terminals to points within the city under
exclusive contract rights with the terminals to provide such transportation, and also the size of the relator's yearly gross income are the
factors which indicate why the Washington court should have held that
the relator's business affected interstate commerce and that the NLRB
therefore had jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court's reversal shows that the relator's business could at least be fairly well
assumed to be one affecting interstate commerce and therefore that
the Board had jurisdiction because of the type of union conduct involved in the controversy.
DENNY E. ANDERSON
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local Government-Municipal Corporations-Power of Eminent
Domain-Condemnation of Lands for Resale to Private Industry.
In Hogue v. Port of Seattle,' an attempted exercise of the power of
29

See footnote 5 supra.

1 154 Wash. Dec. 319, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
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eminent domain was held unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme
Court, when the Port of Seattle sought to acquire, redevelop, and sell
or lease to private industry some 10002 acres of land along the Duwamish River.
The Port's plan was the product of ten years of public concern for
Seattle's increasing status as a one-industry city. Statistics at the end
of World War II showed that Boeing Airplane Company alone employed over half the industrial employees of the area' and that this
dependency was increasing.' In 1951, Seattle, the Port District, and
King County were authorized to investigate a project for improving
sections of the Seattle area for land development and future industrial
purposes.' The 1955 Industrial Development District Act' which resulted was followed by a 1957 tax authorization' to carry out the powers
granted to port districts by the 1955 act.
The 1955 act proclaimed "marginal"' lands to be a serious menace,
contributing to problems of juvenile delinquency and inimical to public
health, welfare, and safety. Redevelopment contemplated was to be
incidental to removing "marginal" conditions of the land. The act
further authorized port districts to create industrial development districts when desirable for harbor impovement and industrial development.' Lands within these districts could be acquired by the port
22175 acres were to be condemned, but only about 1000 were to be used for sale or
lease to private industry.
3 154 Wash. Dec. 319, 325, 341 P.2d 171, 174 (1959).
-Ibid.
5Wash. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 33 § 1.
a Wash. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 73, codified as RCW 5325.
7 Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 265, codified as RCW 53.36.100.
8 RCW 53.25.030 makes any one or more of the following characteristics cause lands
to be marginal: (1) An economic dislocation, deterioration, or disuse resulting from
faulty planning. (2) The subdividing and sale of lots of irregular form and shape and
inadequate size for proper use and development (3) The laying out of lots in disregard of the contours and other physical characteristics of the ground and surrounding conditions. (4) The existence of inadequate streets, open spaces, and utilities.
(5) The existence of lots or other areas which are subject to being submerged by
water. (6) By a prevalence of depreciated values, impaired investments, and social and
economic maladjustment to such an extent that the capacity to pay taxes is reduced
and tax receipts are inadequate for the cost of public services rendered. (7) In some
parts of marginal lands, a growing or total lack of proper utilization of areas, resulting
in a stagnant and unproductive condition of land potentially useful and valuable for
contributing to the public health, safety and welfare. (8) In other parts of marginal
lands, a loss of population and reduction of proper utilization of the area, resulting in
its further deterioration and added costs to the taxpayer for the creation of new
public facilities and services elsewhere. (9) Property of an assessed valuation of insufficient amount to permit the establishment of a local improvement district for the
construction and installation of streets, walks, sewers, water and other utilities. (10)
Lands within an industrial area which are not devoted to industrial use but which are
necessary to industrial development within the industrial area.
9RCW 53.25.040.
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district by eminent domain or by purchase." After they were redeveloped for industrial purposes, they could be sold to private industries
in furtherance of harbor development or industrial development or
both. 1 Thus, there were two groups of lands which could be acquired
and sold by a port district: (1) all lands necessary for the development
and improvement of an industrial development district-determined
without regard for marginal characteristics-and (2) marginal lands
within industrial development districts."
Pursuant to the 1955 and 1957 statutes, the Port of Seattle District
adopted resolution No. 1814, creating the Duwamish Industrial Development District, declaring all the lands within it to be marginal and
establishing a comprehensive scheme of harbor improvements and industrial development.' Hogue and other taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of the 1957 act and sought to enjoin expenditures of the
proceeds of the two-mill levy made pursuant thereto.
The superior court found the lands within the district to be marginal,
but the supreme court decided this was unsupported by the evidence.
Thus, the issue was whether the Port District could form an industrial
district and condemn lands within it, regardless of marginal characteristics, for the purpose of expanding industrial development in Seattle.
The court pointed out that there are two constitutional restrictions
on the power of the state and its municipal subdivisions to acquire
private property by eminent domain in Washington: that just compensation must be paid and that a court must determine whether the
use for which the property is sought is really a public use. 4 The court
determined that the proposed condemnation of other than marginal
land was unconstitutional because it was for a private purpose: "development and sale thereof to private entities for use as industrial
sites."' In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished three
Washington cases.'
Of these three, the case most in point, State ex rel. State Reclamation
Bd. v. Clausen, involved a land settlement act passed under the police
power. It provided that veterans and industrial workers desiring a
10 RCW 53.25.100.

11 RCW 53.25.110.
12 RCW 53.25.190.
13 154 Wash. Dec. 319, 326, 341 P.2d 171, 175 (1959).
' 4 Id. at 357, 341 P.2d at 193 (1959), and WASH. CONST. ART. I,§ 16 (amend. 9).
15 Id.at 356, 341 P.2d at 192 (1959).
16 Bowes v. City of Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 109 Pac. 369 (1910) ; State ex rel.
State Reclamation Bd. v. Clausen, 110 Wash. 525, 188 Pac. 538, 14 A.L.R. 1133 (1920);
Carstens v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1. 8 Wn.2d 136, 111 P.2d 583 (1941).
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rural life could lease or buy farms from the state reclamation board.
The land was not to be acquired by eminent domain, but by purchase;
unlike the Duwamish area, the land was unoccupied. Although the
majority held that the expenditure of tax funds was for a public purpose, the dissent claimed that the only basis for this conclusion was
the legislative declaration of public purpose. Whether or not this interpretation of Clausen is accurate is immaterial." In Hogue v. Port
of Seattle, the court found no need to determine whether the legislative declaration of a public purpose was conclusive, because subsequent to the Clausen case a constitutional amendment was adopted.
This amendment provides that whether a contemplated use for property acquired by condemnation is really public should be a judicial
question, decided without reference to any legislative declaration of
public use.18
Apparently the basic factor which motivated the Hogue court to
declare section 10 of the 1955 act unconstitutional (that section providing for condemnation of non-marginal lands) was that the Duwamish lands, unlike those in Clausen, were occupied and fairly prosperous. The court pointed out that the lands were not congested
urban lands, unoccupied lands, tidelands, or wild, undeveloped lands.
Rather, they were well-developed agricultural and residential lands.
In view of this circumstance, the court saw as the basis for taking the
property the theory that the Port could condemn fully developed lands
because it thought it could devote them to a "higher and better economic use."" Negating existence of such a power, the court held:
No matter how desirable from an operating standpoint the Port's exclusive control of land use in a given area may appear to be, it is the
duty of the courts to uphold the rights of private property against the
inroads of public bodies who seek to acquire it for private purposes
17
Doubt might be expressed as to this interpretation of Clausen. The court there
quoted from many authorities and then stated: "We feel certain that these considerations, general as they are, lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the question of public
purpose involved in this case, because of its inherent nature, because of the opportunity
for difference of opinion as to whether or not the purpose is public in the sense of it
being a legitimate function of government, and because of the question of public policy
necessarily involved in it, is one which we are not permitted to render a different
decision upon than that rendered by the Legislature." 110 Wash. 525, 541, 188 Pac.
538, 539 (1920).
Because of those three considerations, the court could not reach a decision different
from that of the Legislature. This need not imply that the court reached its conclusion
simply because the legislature stated that there was a public purpose. It may imply
that the facts of the case, in view of the authorities considered, led to a result which
merely coincided with that of the legislature, and the unfortunate choice of words
above quoted was the basis of misunderstanding by the dissent and others.
138154 Wash. Dec. 319, 350, 341 P.2d 171, 189 (1959), and WAsHr. CoNsT. ART. I, § 16.
1) 154 Wash. Dec. 319, 346, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (1959).
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which they honestly believe to be essential for the public good....
Thus the property owner is assured that, until our state constitution is amended, he may continue to own, possess, and use his property
(for any lawful purpose) regardless of whether the state or any subdivision thereof may devise a plan for putting the property to a higher
or better economic
use than that to which the owner is currently de°

voting

it.2

Despite its finding that the lands involved were not marginal, the
court "studious[ly] annihilat[ed]1 2 1 the straw man of the marginal
lands concept. It cited Crommett v. City of Portland,2 which upheld
the validity of a slum clearance and redevelopment statute but limited
its decision thus: "Several of the conditions stated in the statute...
do not in our view touch upon a public use. Examples are found in
'faulty lot layout,' 'deterioration of site,' 'diversity of ownership,'...,,23

(Note that these are among the characteristics which make lands
"marginal" under the Washington act. 24) It also cited a 1958 Delaware decision 25 upholding a slum clearance statute which, in dicta,
pointed out that factors such as "defective or inadequate street layout" and "diversity of ownership" have no direct relation to public
health, safety, or morals.26 In view of these decisions and others, the
Washington court concluded that there was no reasonable relation between the acquisition of marginal lands under the 1955 act and promotion of public peace, health, and safety. Although this casts doubt
on the ability of a port district ever to condemn lands as marginal
under the 1955 act, the court found no need to decide the issue, because it was limited by the facts and its finding that the lands involved were not marginal." It did hold that the provisions of the
1955 act relating to condemnation of marginal lands were unconstitutional as applied to the Duwamish District. It is difficult to see why
the court lingered so long on a question it did not intend to decide,
unless it was to show the caution used in respect to private rights even
in an area where condemnation might be upheld.
The issue whether or not it is constitutional for a city to condemn
occupied and relatively prosperous lands for redevelopment and sale
20 Id. at 356, 341 P.2d at 193.

154 Wash. Dec. 319, 359, 341 P.2d 171, 194 (1959).
150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841 (1954).
23 Id. at 235, 107 A.2d at 851. A similar viewpoint was expressed in Schneider v.
District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953).
24 See note 8 supra.
25 Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Auth., 139 A.2d 476 (Del. 1958).
261d. at 484.
27 154 Wash. Dec. 319, 344, 341 P.2d 171, 186 (1959).
21
22
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to private industry has never before been decided in Washington 8
In 1957, in one of the few decisions directly ruling on the issue,2 9 the
Maine court held unconstitutional an act designed to promote industrial development. Its basis, like our court's, was that condemnation
of the necessary sites was for a private purpose-the direct benefit of
private industry.
Although over twenty states have upheld statutes authorizing municipalities to condemn slum areas for redevelopment and sale to
private owners, 0 dicta in many of these cases indicates that condemnation for redevelopment and sale to private industry would be unconstitutional." The typical slum clearance statute permits condemnation of overcrowded residential areas where lack of ventilation,
light, air, and sanitation tend to produce fires, disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, and the like. 2 Although the Washington
statute declares that marginal lands contribute to crime and juvenile
delinquency and menace health, welfare, and safety," the "marginal"
characteristics therein are not those of the typical slum clearance
statute."' As the dissent in Hogue pointed out, this may be because
"the legal draftsman attempt[ed] to confer some semblance of orthodoxy or acceptance upon the unusual, if not actually unorthodox, yet
challenging program of industrial development envisioned by our leg-

islature."8 5
Belovsky v. Redevelopment Autl., 8 however, seems more in support
281d

at 339, 341 P.2d at 182. The issue appears to have been presented in Heisey v.

Port of Tacoma, 4 Wn.2d 76, 102 P.2d 258 (1940), but the court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue.
28 Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904, 906, 907 (1957) (cited by the
court).
so Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 139 A.2d 476, 483 (Del. 1958).
Some of the cases upholding slum clearance statutes are: Cromett v. City of Portland,
150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841 (1954) ; In re Slum Clearance in City of Detroit, 331 Mich.
714, 50 N.W.2d 340 (1951) ; Rowe v. Housing Authority, 220 Ark. 698, 249 S.W.2d
551 (1952) ; Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 195 Va. 326, 78
S.E.2d 893 (1953) ; David Jeffrey Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W.2d
362 (1954) ; Papadinis v. City of Somerville, 331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954) ;
Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.C. 1953) ; Foeller v. Housing
Authority, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

31 See discussion of the Crommett and Randolph cases, supra. The courts expressed
doubt as to validity of parts of the statutes not relating to slums. Characteristics such
as "faulty lot layout' and "deterioration of site" there discussed are the same type of
characteristics which the 1955 Washington act calls "marginal." See also Schneider v.
District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 719 (D.C. 1953).
32 Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Auth., 139 A.2d 476, 479 (Del. 1958).
83RCW 53.25.010, .020.
84 See text of Washington statute at note 8, supra.
385154 Wash. Dec. 319, 359, 341 P.2d 171, 194 (1959).
8 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947).
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of condemnation for redevelopment of non-slum areas. The court there
upheld the statute in question, saying its one major purpose was:
the elimination and rehabilitation of the blighted sections of our municipalities, and that purpose certainly falls within any conception of
"public use" for nothing can be more beneficial to the community as
a whole than the clearance and reconstruction of those sub-standard
areas which are characterized
by the evils described in the Urban Re3
development law.

7

Yet the statute does not appear to include the usual terminology of
slum characteristics but, rather, characteristics more like the 1955
Washington act."

The dissent in Belovsky pointed out:

The constitutionality of statutes dealing with redevelopment and encompassing similar purposes has not been determined by the appellant
courts in any state. The distinction between the two types of statutes
is clear when their scope is considered.... I have been unable to find
a single case wherein the constitutionality of a redevelopment law, as
distinguished from a slum clearance law, was involved. 9
Although the decision in Belovsky, taken with the dissent, appears
to give some support to redevelopment statutes, it must be noted that
there was no provision in the act for resale of the lands to private
industry. There was also no indication of the nature of the lands
which were declared to be "blighted." Since the court relied on the
typical slum clearance cases, it may be it foresaw redevelopment for
private housing. If so, the case does not necessarily indicate the court
would have upheld a statute similar to the 1955 Washington act.
In 1954, the California court upheld redevelopment of Diamond
Heights, a non-slum area,4" but, according to the court, 85% of the
area condemned was vacant." (Dwellings and public buildings were
to be built on the land.) What the court would have done had the
lands been well-developed agricultural and residential lands like the
Duwamish area cannot be predicted.
Although the slum clearance cases seem to indicate unconstitutionality of both the marginal lands section of the 1955 act and the section authorizing condemnation to further industrial development, there
is some inconsistency in their reasoning. The courts seem to say that
they would not uphold condemnation and redevelopment to promote
37357 Pa. 329, 54
38357 Pa. 329, 54
39 357 Pa. 329, 54
40 Redevelopment

A.2d at 282 (1947).

A.2d at 279 (1947).

A.2d at 286 (1947).
Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954).

41266 P.2d at 118.
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private industry. Yet in allowing redevelopment for private housing,
they often turn the job over to private building industries.,2 Does
this mean it is in the public interest to aid private builders, but not
to aid private manufacturers? The courts would doubtless answer by
saying that giving this job to private builders is only incidental to the
main purpose of slum clearance. But what was the main purpose of
the 1955 act? Was not redevelopment and sale to private industries
only incidental to the main purpose, namely, correcting the imbalance
of Seattle's economy caused by the "present heavy emphasis upon aircraft and missile defense production"?"
In this light, it becomes interesting to note the many decisions where
the states' taxing powers have been used to attract industries to cities.
As early as 1938, the Mississippi court in Albritton v. City of Winonz"
upheld a statute authorizing municipalities to sell manufacturing plants
to private corporations. Bonds were to be issued to finance acquisition of the manufacturing plants by the city. The court found the
statute valid as a means of alleviating unemployment. Although some
courts have distinguished between financing through special bonds and
financing through general tax revenues, 5 three recent cases seem to
ignore this distinction.
In the first of them, Dyche v. City of London," the Kentucky court
upheld the issue of bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used to
finance construction of an industrial building to be leased to private
industry. The court reasoned: "The purpose of the plan is to attract
new industry to the area and thereby reduce unemployment, which,
T
according to the evidence, has reached an abnormal point."I
42

Randolph v. Wilmington Housing Auth., 139 A2d 476, 483 (Del. 1958).
43 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 154 Wash. Dec. 319, 362, 341 P.2d 171, 196 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
44181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938).
45 I

Faulconer v. City of

Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80, 83 (1950), the

court said: "The courts of the country are of divided opinion, though the majority
hold that the encouragement and promotion of a specific industrial enterprise under an
arrangement similar to the present where it involves the taxing power is beyond the
constitutional power of a legislature or a municipality.... Unlike the statute providing for the acquisition and development of public projects generally by the revenue
bond plan ... the statute under which this project is being developed contains no provision permitting the use of general funds or revenues to finance the same, or the payment of any bonds issued therefor."
In Villiage of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920, 928 (1956), the
court said: "There is nothing in the Constitution which forbids our Legislature from
authorizing a municipality to promote a private industry in the manner authorized by
the aforementioned provision . . . since those provisions do not authorize the use of
moneys raised by taxation for the accomplishment of the incidental public purpose
intended."
467 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956).
4 Id. at 649.
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The next year, in 1957, the Maryland court upheld an election for
authorization to issue municipal bonds for a similar purpose."' After
setting forth the general rule that "public funds of municipalities cannot properly be devoted to private use, even when expressly author' the court found that "the relief of unemployized by the legislature,"49
ment is a legitimate public purpose. The fact that incidental benefits
are passed on to the locating corporation is not fatal, if there are substantial public benefits to support the action taken."" °
In 1958,"' the Tennessee court upheld a contract by which the town
of Lebanon leased to a private industry for twenty-five years a factory
which was to be built from proceeds of municipal bonds. After considering the rule that taxation had to be for a public purpose, the
court said:
An inadequate number of jobs means an oversupply of labor, which
usually results ultimately in a lowering of wages. Low wages and unemployment are twin evils that usually lead to a sub-standard diet,
hunger, ill health and even crime. To provide against such evils is
clearly a public or corporate purpose. To accomplish that purpose, the
or means not prohibited by the
legislature may provide any method
52
Constitution, State or Federal.
Perhaps the only way to reconcile the bond issue cases, the slum
clearance cases, and Hogue v. Port of Seattle, is to look not at whether
private industry is aided, but instead at the burden on those paying
for the aid. In the bond issue cases, the burden through taxation is
spread over more people than it is when eminent domain power is exercised. To alleviate unemployment the courts are willing to find the
public purpose required for taxation. To alleviate slum conditions they
will find the public purpose required for eminent domain. But when
the legislature goes beyond short-run unemployment to long-run industrial balance of our state's economy, and seeks to do this by taking
already well-developed agricultural and residential lands, the burden
on the property owner is too great to warrant a finding of public
purpose.
Although the court's decision seems warranted on both precedent
and policy, Seattle's economic problem remains unsolved. No solution
is possible under that section of the 1955 act which provides for con48

City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957).

49 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852, 854 (1957).

50 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852, 856 (1957).
51 McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 314 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1958).
r2 !d. at 20.
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demnation of lands in an industrial development district to further
industrial expansion and port improvement. The only opening left
in this act by the court is under the "marginal lands" sections. (The
court held the "marginal lands" concept unconstitutional only as applied to the Duwamish area.) Even here the prospect of a solution
seems dim in view of the court's extensive dicta on the subject. Moreover, even if this section were upheld in another context, the availability of suitable land presents a problem.
In any area of eminent domain the city will be faced with the hurdle
of the Hogue decision. Perhaps the legislature would do well to abandon the 1955 act and the marginal lands concept. A more profitable
solution might be found in an act authorizing municipalities to issue
bonds and use the proceeds to purchase, redevelop, and resell lands
for industrial sites. Perhaps the precedent of the bond case based on
short-run unemployment needs could more easily be extended to industrial improvement on a long range scale, than can eminent domain
as used in the slum clearance cases.
DoNNA BERG
Local Government-Zoning Ordinances-Power to Require Termination of a Nonconforming Use. The state supreme court expanded
municipal land use controls in City of Seattle v. Martin' by holding
constitutional a zoning ordinance which required the termination of a
nonconforming use during a one-year period after the ordinance's
effective date.
The nonconforming use-repairing trucks, bulldozers, and other construction equipment-took place on a residential vacant lot, held under
a month-to-month tenancy. Evidence showed that the work was sometimes very noisy and often carried on at night.' Martin had operated
this business for nine years. On January 4, 1954, this lot together with
the surrounding area was annexed to the City of Seattle and made "first
residence" property under the city zoning ordinance.' The ordinance
provided in part that: "In the First or Second Residence Districts,
any nonconforming use of premises which is not in a building shall be
discontinued within a period of one year from the date this ordinance
shall become effective."&
Martin refused to discontinue his repair business after the one year
had elapsed, and consequently was tried and found guilty of violating
1 154 Wash. Dec. 663, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).

Id. at 666, 342 P.2d at 604.
3 Seattle Ordinance No. 45382 (1954).
4Ibid.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 35

the ordinance. On appeal he contended that he had acquired a property
right in his use of the premises as a repair lot prior to January 4, 1954,
and that his conviction gave the ordinance an unconstitutional retroactive effect.'
Although the court had not yet decided that a city could end a nonconforming use, it had considered the city's power to control or regulate such a use. In 195 2,1 it decided State ex rel. Miller v. Cain,holding
that a city could restrict changes in nonconforming uses to repairs and
alterations for structural safety. Thus, the nonconforming user, a
service station owner in a residential district, was precluded from constructing an adjoining building for rest rooms and a grease rack.
In Seattle v. Martin, supra, the court adopted the reasoning of the
earlier Miller case, quoting as follows:
The theory of the zoning ordinance is that her [the property owner's]
nonconforming use is in fact detrimental to some one or more of those
public interests (health, safety, morals or welfare) which justify the
invoking of the police power; but the nonconforming use was permitted
to continue because its termination would constitute a hardship on her
greater 7than the benefit the public would derive from termination of
the use.
Although this quote could well have provided authority to hold that
termination of a nonconforming use is always an unconstitutional hardship on the nonconformist, the court rejected this view. Instead it
deduced from the above statement that: "[T] he test in the instant case
[Martin] is whether the significance of the hardship as to appellant is
more compelling, or whether it reasonably overbalances the benefit
which the public would derive from the termination of the use ... ..

The court reasoned that since Martin rented the vacant lot on a
month-to-month basis, his hardship in closing down in the one-year
period was slight.' The public benefit derived in removing the business
from a residential district was correspondingly great.
This decision goes farther than cases in some jurisdictions, ° yet not
as far as others," in expanding the zoning power of municipalities.
5 154 Wash. Dec. 663, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
640 Wn.2d 216, 242 P.2d 505 (1952).
7 Id. at 220, 242 P.2d at 508.
8 154 Wash.Dec. 663, 664, 342 P.2d 602, 604 (1959). Also see text at note 22 infra.
9One might question the validity of finding hardship on the type of tenancy involved.
10 City of Akron v.Chapman,160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953), criticized in
Note,67 HARv. L. REv. 1283 (1954).

11 Standard Oil Co.v.City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950) ; City of
Los Angeles v.Gage, 127 Cal. 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954) ; Harbison v.City of Buffalo,
4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).
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When zoning ordinances were first passed, they restricted only future
uses of land within the established district.1 2 The reasoning upon which
these ordinances were upheld as being within the police power was
clearly set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.:"
The segregation of industries, commercial pursuits and dwellings to
particular districts in a city, when exercised reasonably, may bear a
rational relation to the health, morals, safety and general welfare of the
community. The establishment of such districts or zones may, among
other things, prevent congestion of population, secure quiet residence
districts, expedite local transportation, and facilitate the suppression of
disorder, the extinguishment of fires and the enforcement of traffic and
sanitary regulations. 4
It was generally believed, however, that while a city could restrict
future uses, it could not limit nonconforming uses which were in existence at the time the ordinance was passed. 5 At the same time, however, the courts were willing to recognize that the zoning power was
broad enough to prohibit expansion of a nonconforming use." In State
ex rel. City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Stegner," the Ohio court upheld an ordinance preventing expansion of a warehouse used for the storage of ice
into one capable also of manufacturing ice. (This case falls in the same
class of cases as does Miller v. Cain, supra.)
During the fifties a new and contrary doctrine appeared in some
jurisdictions. In StandardOil Co. v. City of Tallahassee,18 a 1939 zoning
ordinance which provided that all service stations in the newly zoned
residential district should be discontinued on and after January 1,
1949, was upheld. The court found that: "The power of a municipality to require by ordinance the discontinuance of an existing property
use also appears to be well established law in Florida."' 9 Because the
service station in question was near the state capital, the supreme court
building, and other state office buildings as well as a public school, the
court found that the ordinance was not arbitrary and unreasonable or
without relation to the general welfare of the community.
Four years later (1954) the California court in City of Los Angeles
12 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 392.
15 Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930). Also see Comment, 39
YALE, L.J. 735, 737 (1930).
16 State ex rel. City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Stegner, 120 Ohio St 418, 166 N.E. 226

(1929).

Ibid.
F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
19 Id. at 413.
17
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v. Gage 20 upheld an ordinance which, as applied, required termination
of defendant's nonconforming plumbing business within five years. It
distinguished an earlier case 2 on the basis that the ordinance involved
there had allowed no period in which to terminate. Citing Washington's Miller case, the California court reasoned that the distinction
between denying expansion of a nonconforming use and requiring its
termination within a reasonable time was only one of degree. Emphasizing the fact that California's ordinance provided for a five year
period to allow defendant's business to be moved, the court said:
Use of a reasonable amortization scheme provides an equitable means
of reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process
requirements. As a method of eliminating existing nonconforming uses
it allows the owner of the nonconforming use, by affording an opportunity to make new plans, at least partially to offset any loss he might
suffer. The loss he suffers, if any, is spread out over a period of years,
and he enjoys a monopolistic position by virtue of the zoning ordinance
as long as he remains. If the amortization period is reasonable the loss
to the 23owner may be small when compared with the benefit to the
public.

Evidence that Gage could move his business a half mile away to a
feasible site at a cost of less than one percent of his minimum gross
business for five years ($5000) was found sufficient to establish that
his amortization period was reasonable and the ordinance was constitutional.
In 1958,24 a New York ordinance requiring termination of a junkyard use within three years was upheld. The facts in Harbison v. City
of Buffalo2" were strikingly similar to those of Seattle v. Martin. The
only exception was that Harbison, the junkdealer, had built a frame
building on his land; hence, termination of his use might have involved
removing or changing a structure. Following the reasoning in California's Gage case, the New York court said that the ordinance was
constitutional as to both prior nonconforming uses and structures. Like
Washington, New York adopted the test of striking a balance between
26
social harm and private injury.
The main reason accounting for the new and contrary doctrine of
21

127 Cal. 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 15.
Id. at 44.

23

Ibid.

20
22

24

Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).

25

Ibid.

Id. at 46-47: "In ascertaining the reasonable period during which an owner of
property must be allowed to continue a nonconforming use, a balance must be found
between social harm and private injury."
26
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the fifties was disclosed in the Harbisoncase.2 The policy of protecting nonconforming uses in their condition at the time of enactment of
the zoning ordinance was premised on the expectation that the ultimate ends of the zoning would be accomplished as the nonconforming
use terminated with the passage of time. Instead of being eliminated,
nonconforming uses flourished by capitalizing on the fact that no new
use of their same nature could compete in their area, thus giving them
a monopolistic position. This development led to the ordinances which
affirmatively seek to terminate the nonconforming uses.
In spite of this development, vigorous dissents arose. 8 In Standard
Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee the dissent said:
...

I am in no doubt that in sustaining this admittedly confiscatory or-

dinance, a good general principle, the public interest in zoning, has
been run into the ground, the tail of legislative confiscation by caprice
has been permitted to wag the dog of judicial constitutional protection."

Perhaps the major reason for cautioning against expansive holdings
is that expressed long ago by Justice Holmes:"0
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation, and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and
due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act.... We are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition
is not enough to warrantachieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change.31(Emphasis added.)
2
In City of Akron v. Chapman,"
the Ohio court found unconstitu-

tional a similar zoning ordinance as applied to a junkyard business
which was in existence at the time the ordinance was passed. Here
27

1d. at 45.
28 Id. at 48 and 183 F2d 410, 413.

F.2d at 414.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 416 (1922).
In 1953 the New York court in Town of Somers v. Camarco, 126 N.Y.S.2d 154

29183
30
81

(1953), quoted most of this italicized portion and said that it had not forgotten the
admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes. It held unconstitutional a zoning law which would
have terminated the use of structures and machinery used in connection with a sand and
gravel pit. This case appears to have been weakened, if not annihilated, by Harbison
v. City of Buffalo, supra note 24 and accompanying text, decided in the same jurisdiction in 1958. But see Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 155 Wash. Dec. 405, 348 P.2d 664
(1960), in which the Washington court quoted Justice Holmes with approval.
32 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E2d 697 (1953).
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again, the facts were similar to Seattle v. Martin. The ordinance did
not require the building to be torn down, but did require termination
of the junkyard in a reasonable time, as determined by the city council. 3 The court said that if it upheld the ordinance as a proper exercise of the police power, the right to continue to conduct other lawful
businesses similarly established on zoned property could likewise be
denied by legislative fiat under the guise of a proper exercise of the
police power.3 4 Considering the nature of property, the court pointed
out that the substantial value of property lies in its use and that if the
right of use is denied, "the value of the property is annihilated and
ownership is rendered a barren right." 5
A 1955 Wisconsin decision, 6 although not directly in point," illustrates the problem encountered in extending the zoning power to permit termination of nonconforming uses. The court there said:
If in the prosecution of governmental functions it becomes necessary to
take private property, compensation must be made. But incidental
damages to property resulting from governmental activities, or laws
passed in the promotion of the public welfare, are not considered a
taking of the property for which compensation must be made."s

Thus in 1955, the danger seen by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1922" and
again recognized in 1953,40 became strikingly apparent. By continually expanding the zoning power through termination of nonconforming uses, a city might accomplish results by zoning which under eminent domain would require not only a public purpose, but compensation.
While the decision in Seattle v. Martin may seem mild in view of the
facts of the case and the often expressed attitude of the courts that
"Defendant's drug store is a small one,"4 1 it is important that our
court, as well as those of other jurisdictions, be aware of the direction
in which it is heading. There are small drug stores, small junk yards,
and small department stores. "Small" is a relative term, and the gen3 A Note in 67 HARV. L. REV. 1283 (1954)
criticizes the Akron decision as inconsistent with the general acceptance of amortization principles, and says that a better
reason for holding the ordinance unconstitutional would have been that the city had
sole discretion to decide if the time for termination was reasonable, hence discriminating

against the property owner.

34 116 N.E.2d at 700.

35 Ibid.
36 State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d

217 (1955).
37 A zoning ordinance regulating structures for aesthetic reasons only was upheld.
38

Id. at 220.

39

260 U.S. 393, 413.

40 See note 31 supra.

41 154 Wash. Dec. 663, 666, 342 P.2d 602, 603-04 (1959), the court quoting from
State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 fa. 752 123 Si, 314 (19201.
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erally proposed test of balancing the hardship on the individual with
the benefit to the public is capable of extension to bigger businesses
and property investments.
Note, for instance, the application of the rule of the principal case
to the facts of Hogue v. Port of Seattle,"2 a case decided by the Washington court only a short while before Seattle v. Martin. There the
court held unconstitutional an attempted exercise of eminent domain
by the Port of Seattle by which it would have condemned approximately 1000 acres of land along the Duwamish River for development
and resale to private industry. The land could not be taken by eminent domain, because the court refused to find a public purpose. Yet
what would happen if Seattle zoned the area for industry only and
required termination of nonconforming residential and farming uses?4"
In practical effect this would accomplish the same result. Most of the
cases expounding the modern rule that the zoning power includes the
power to terminate nonconforming uses have applied that rule only to
terminate the use of the businessman in the residential district." The
junkman," the repairman, " and the service station 7 have been forced
to leave the residential district. If this is constitutionl, is it not logically as constitutional to force the farmer to leave the only available
strip of land which adequately lends itself to industrial development
in the Seattle area? Might not the test of the Martin case disclose that
the public benefit in attracting industry and locating it in a well planned
and desirable section of the city outweighs the hardship on the farmer
who has to leave-especially if it is only a "small" farm?
Does the Martin case indicate that the City of Seattle can accomplish by zoning what it cannot accomplish by an exercise of eminent
domain? In the Hogue case, the court protected individual property
rights where a taking of them would have required compensation. In
the Martin case it allows a taking of rights-if not property in the
strict sense, at least a use of property-where no compensation is made.
Whatever be the policy result desired, would it not be better that our
court clearly articulate its policy reasoning and at least compensate
DONNA BERG
a property owner for a taking of his rights?
42

154 Wash. Dec. 319, 341 P2d 171 (1959).

this3 issue.

See immediately preceding Casenote,

4 In Courthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953), the
court held unconstitutional an attempt to exclude residential uses from an industrial
zone, but implied that in some fact situations such an attempt might be constitutional.
44 Note 11 supra.
4
5 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E2d 42 (1958).
46 City of Seattle v. Martin, 154 Wash. Dec. 663, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
47 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
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Suspension of Civil Service Employee-Due Process Requirements. In Yantsin v. City of Aberdeen,' the Supreme Court of
Washington held that a police chief may constitutionally be given
arbitrary power to suspend a civil service employee without charges
or hearing and without cause. The court found that this grant of power
by an Aberdeen city ordinance was permitted by statute, and that
constitutional questions did not arise, because government employment
is not a property right to which due process guarantees extend. There
being no inherent protection of tenure in a government job, said the
court, an employee under civil service has only such protection against
arbitrary suspension or removal as is expressly given to him by the
statute or ordinance establishing the civil service system under which
he is employed.
Yantsin, a police captain, came within the civil service ordinance of
the City of Aberdeen which, after setting forth the causes and procedures for removal from employment, stated: "Nothing in this section
shall limit the power of an officer to suspend, without pay, a subordinate
for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days."2
The police chief of Aberdeen suspended Captain Yantsin from his

position, without pay, for thirty days. No charges were filed, nor
hearing given. The complaint alleged that the reasons for the suspension were political, not in good faith, and not for cause. Two patrolmen
were also suspended. Yantsin brought suit for his lost wages, and as
assignee of the patrolmen's claim for lost wages. The briefs reveal
that the parties were in dispute as to the reasons for the suspensions.
However, the city demurred to the complaint on the grounds that it
failed to state a cause of action. The trial court dismissed the action,
sustaining the demurrer. On appeal, the supreme court's opinion stated
that its decision must therefore be based on the assumption that the
suspension was without cause. The trial court's dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.
The appellant urged that the Washington statute "Civil Service for
City Police," 3 and not the Aberdeen ordinance, should govern the case.
That statute provides4 that removals, suspensions, demotions, and discharges must be upon written accusation and upon a hearing, if requested. (Yantsin's request for a hearing had been denied.) The court
pointed out that the statute expressly exempted from its coverage cities
1 154 Wash.

Dec. 967, 345 P.2d 178 (1959).
2 Aberdeen, Wash., Ord. 3613 § 8, or § 1.38.080 as codified (TR. 18-32).
3 Wash. Sess. Laws, 1937, c. 13, p. 23.
4 RCW 41.12.090.
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and towns that had already provided for civil service in their police
departments. Aberdeen fell within this exception so its ordinance did
not conflict with state law.
The additional arguments of Yantsin were that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it authorized summary suspension without
charges or hearing and was violative of due process, and that even if
the provision were constitutional, it necessarily carried the implication
that a suspension must be in good faith and for cause. To the first
argument, the court replied that unless the applicable ordinance or
statute expressly required, notice and hearing are not prerequisites to
a suspension. Several Washington cases were cited in support of this
proposition.' In none of these cases was alleged bad faith and absence
of cause made an issue.
To the second argument of the appellant-that it should be implied
as a matter of law that the power given in the ordinance carried with it
the implication that a suspension must be for cause and in good faiththe court replied that the ordinance "is clear and unambiguous, and
needs no interpretation." The court noted that although the ordinance
states grounds and provides for the filing of charges and a hearing when
removal is involved, the suspension provision does not do so, and the
court could not rewrite the ordinance.
Due process has been characterized as "the protection of the individual against arbitrary action."' The Washington court recognizes
this aspect of due process protection7 and has said:
Where actions of officers are made discretionary by statute, the courts
will not disturb them. If, however, the officers' actions are arbitrary,
tyrannical, or predicated upon a fundamentally wrong basis, then courts
must interfere to protect the rights of individuals.8
That a grant of discretionary authority is inherently subject to a
limitation that it may not be used arbitrarily or unreasonably seems
settled law.9 Courts may review the actions of public officials to de5State ex rel. Gebenini v. Wright, 43 Wn.2d 829, 264 P.2d 1091 (1953) ; Schell v.
City of Aberdeen, 28 Wn.2d 335, 183 P.2d 466 (1947) ; State ex rel. Ausburn v. City of
Seattle, 190 Wash. 222, 67 P2d 913 (1937) ; Darnell v. Mills, 75 Wash. 663, 135 Pac.

475 (1913).

OJustice Cardozo in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Conm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302
(1937).
7 State v. Cater's Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 27 Wn.2d 661, 179 P.2d 496 (1947).
8 In re Calif. Ave. Local Improvement Dist. No. 575, 30 Wn.2d 144, 147, 190 P.2d
738, 740 (1948). See also, State ex rel. Voris v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 133 Pac. 11
(1913), in which the court assumed it could review for "good faith" a city council's
action abolishing civil service positions.
9 Jernigan v. Loid Rainwater Co., 196 Ark. 251, 117 S.W.2d 18 (1938) ; People ex
rel. Ghent v. Cleveland R.R., 365 Il. 443, 6 N.E.2d 851 (1937).
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termine whether there has been an arbitrary decision or an abuse of
discretion." Yet the Washington court held that the lower court was
not in error in refusing to review Yantsin's suspension, in spite of the
allegations of bad faith and political reasons for his superior's action.
The allegation amounted to a charge of arbitrary abuse of discretion
in that the reasons for the suspension had no reasonable relation to
his employment.
The court's reason for dismissing this "implied limitation" argument
of the appellant, almost without discussion, seems to be its belief that
government employment is not a right entitled to any protection under
due process guarantees. The court relied heavily on Bailey v. Richardson,1 a 1950 decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. An employee dismissed from government employment on
loyalty grounds sought a declaratory judgment and reinstatement on the
ground that she had been stigmatized in the public eye and deprived of
the possibility of making a living without being afforded procedural due
process. Her plea was denied on the ground that her government employment was a privilege, not a right, 2 and she could be deprived of it
without procedural due process. There was a strong dissent in the circuit court. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision
of the circuit court was affirmed because the Supreme Court was split
four to four on the issues involved. The case seems of doubtful authority. In referring to an earlier case, the Court has said:
Nor was our affirmance of the judgment in that case by an equally
divided court an authoritative precedent. While it was conclusive and
binding upon the parties as respects that controversy [citations
omitted], the lack of an agreement by a majority of the Court on the
principles of law involved prevents it from being an authoritative determination for other cases ....1

Furthermore, statements in other United States Supreme Court cases
10 McDonough v. Goodeell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035 (1939) ; Heaps v. Cobb, 185
Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945) ; In re Calif. Ave. Local Improvement Dist. No. 575, 30
Wn.2d 144, 190 P.2d 738 (1948).
11 182 F.2d 46, 58, (D.C.Cir. 1950), aff'd by equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918

(1951).
12 But cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), footnote 5:
"We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a 'right' or 'privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation
is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing
except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's
grace. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 379."
If the validity of a denial of the permission to practice law should not be determined
by attaching a label of "right" or "privilege," it would seem, a fortiori, that attaching
a label of "privilege" to civil service employment does not cure an alleged lack of valid
reasons for a suspension from civil service employment.
13 U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942).
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suggest that the Court does not adhere to the broad proposition, stated
in Bailey, that there is no constitutionally protected right to public
employment. In referring to language used in the cases of Adler v.
Board of Educ.4 and United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,15 which have
been cited for the same broad proposition, Justice Clark said:
To draw from this language the facile generalization that there is no
constitutionally protected right to public employment is to obscure the
issue... Constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
The above statement was made in Wieman v. Updegraff,8 which involved a discharge from government employment which the court found
to be wrongful. In Slockower v. Board of Higher Educ.,'1 another
wrongful discharge case, the United States Supreme Court again followed the principle stated in the Updegraff case. If this view of the
relation between due process guarantees and public employment had
been brought to the attention of the Washington court, the allegation
in Yantsin that the suspension power was used for improper "bad faith"
reasons might have been found to state a cause of action. It seems
regrettable that the holding of the Bailey case, with its "national security" overtones and influences, should have been applied to this case
in a civil service setting.
An interesting comparison can be made with a recent California case,
Petermann v. InternationalBkd. of Teamsters. 8 In that case, a business agent employed by a union was allowed to recover accrued salary
following what was held to be a wrongful discharge, although his employment was admittedly terminable at will. He was discharged for
his refusal to give false testimony at a legislative committee hearing;
he had been instructed to do so by his employer. The California court
said that the right to discharge an employee may be limited by statute
or public policy. The state's public policy against perjury, as evidenced
by statutes making perjury or subornation of perjury a criminal offense,
would not permit the union to discharge an employee for refusing to
perform an act injurious to the public interest.
The same public policy argument which was applied to private employment in the California case might have been appropriately used in
134
342 U.S. 485 (1952).

3. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

344 U. S.183, 191-92 (1952).
1,350 U.S. 551 (1956).
i8 344 P.2d 25 (Calif. 1959).
16
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the public employment setting of the Yantsin case. It might have been
said that the purpose and policy behind the establishment of municipal
civil service systems is to insure, in the public interest, the employment
of faithful, competent officers regardless of their political affiliation,
and to protect the officers against summary removal from office." It
would follow that use of a suspension power to vitiate this purpose"0
and to introduce political favoritism into police department administration would be contrary to public policy as actually embodied in Washington's statute 2 '
JOYCE M. THOMAS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Summary Judgment.' In several 1959 decisions, the Washington
Supreme Court has considered the application of Rule 56 of the Washington Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure Two of these
decisions illustrate facets of summary judgment procedure which the
court has explored.
In Stringfellow v. Stringfellow,8 the plaintiff sought to gain possession of United States savings bonds issued in his name and held by his
father (defendant), who had purchased them. The plaintiff, with
supporting affidavits, moved for a summary judgment. No controverting affidavits were filed by the defendant. The trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion.
On appeal, defendant contended that his answer and cross-complaint
raised issues of material facts as effectively as would counter-affidavits.
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court rejected this contention,
reasoning that since Rule 56(e) requires that supporting and opposing
19 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 479, quoted approvingly in State ex rel. Voris
v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 133 Pac. 11 (1913).
20 It is interesting to note that when charges were later preferred against police captain Yantsin in proceedings for his dismissal, the charges were dropped, after four days
of hearings, before he had the opportunity to present a defense. He was restored to his
position. His suspension would seem to have served no useful purpose with regard to
the administration of the police department.
21 RCW 41.12.090, Civil Service for City Police.
1 This Note supplements a Note on summary judgment which appeared at 34 WASH.
L. REv. 204 (1959).
2 154 Wash. Dec. 60 (1959). In addition to the decisions discussed and cited herein,
two other cases presented phases of the summary judgment procedure. In Mayflower
Air-Conditioners, Inc. v. West Coast Heating Serv., Inc., 154 Wash. Dec. 203, 339
P.2d 89 (1959), the court held that a motion for judgment on the pleadings will not
be treated as a motion for summary judgment under the circumstances described in
Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 12(c) unless there is compliance with the
notice requirements of Rule 56. Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wn.2d 716, 336 P.2d
878 (1959), held that a "summary judgment, interlocutory in character . . . rendered
on the issue of liability alone" under Rule 56(c) is, in effect, a pre-trial order, which
will not be reviewed by certiorari in advance of trial of the damaging issue.

